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INTRODUCTION
Experimental research in behavioral
economics has revealed a high degree of
prosocial tendencies in human interac-
tions. These results have been interpreted
as suggesting a necessary shift from a
model of selfish preferences toward social
preferences—the assumption that people
intrinsically are concerned about oth-
ers’ well-being (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). In
this article, we first introduce research
on prosocial behavior from an economics
perspective. We then review several stud-
ies that invalidate this social preferences
hypothesis by demonstrating that prosocial
behavior is reduced when behavior is not
observable by relevant others and expec-
tations to behave prosocially are lowered.
We argue that people primarily pursue
self-interest as long as they can retain the
appearance of being fair to others and even
themselves—an interpretation referred to
asmoral hypocrisy (Batson, 2011). Further,
we highlight implications for research of
this assumption.
In behavioral economics, prosocial
behavior toward strangers has been
examined using the Dictator Game (DG)
in which two strangers anonymously
interact with each other, typically via
computers so that they cannot see each
other. Classic versions of this game are
played under perfect information, mean-
ing that both players are informed about
the rules and the possible actions each
player may take. One person is randomly
assigned the role of the dictator and the
other person the role of the recipient.
Dictators get an initial $10 and are given
the opportunity to decide how much
money they want to hand over to the
recipient. Recipients, in contrast, begin the
game without any initial endowment and
cannot influence their final payoff. Clearly,
a selfish dictator would keep everything.
However, a meta-analysis by Engel (2011)
covering 41,433 single DGs shows that on
average, people give about 28.35% of their
endowment to the other person and 17%
of the dictators give half of it. Henrich
et al. (2004) confirmed these findings in
cross-cultural studies. Similar cooperative
tendencies are found in other economic
games like theUltimatum Game, the Third
Party Punishment Game and the Public
Good Game (Camerer, 2003). Behavioral
economists have tried to explain this kind
of prosocial behavior by assuming that
people have social preferences. Some of
their models suggest that people are intrin-
sically motivated to reach fair distributive
outcomes (cf. Fehr and Schmidt, 2006).
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), for instance,
assume that people are inequity averse
and therefore try to minimize the dif-
ference between distributional outcomes.
Even though these models are successful in
explaining a large amount of data, several
studies seem to question their underly-
ing assumption. These studies add a more
psychological angle by subtly modifying
economic games in a way that manipulate
participants’ beliefs about what behavior
others might expect from them.
MEETING OTHER PARTICIPANTS’
EXPECTATIONS
Dana et al. (2006) introduced a modi-
fied version of the DG, which allowed
dictators to eliminate the recipient’s expec-
tations. As in the classic DG, dictators
could decide how to split their $10. After
they have made their putative decision,
but right before its implementation, the
experimenter intervened offering the fol-
lowing option: either dictators could go
ahead with their decision and divide the
amount of money as intended, or they
could choose to pay $1 in order to exit
the game. In this case, the recipient would
never be told that the game happened
in the first place. Hence, dictators who
exited only received $9 while the recipient
received nothing. Assuming people were
truly motivated to ensure fair distributive
outcomes, we would assume that partici-
pants would stick to their primary decision
and split the money fairly. However, in two
experiments 28% and 43% of the dicta-
tors chose the exit option independently
of their primary decision. Some of the
participants initially decided to split fairly
but as soon as they knew the recipient
was not expecting anything, they behaved
selfishly. An interpretation could be that
people were willing to pay money to make
sure others would not find out. This is in
sharp contrast to what models of money-
maximizing preferences (keeping the full
amount) or social preferences (splitting
fairly) would predict.
Similarly, in another study, partici-
pants were playing a modified version of
the Ultimatum Game involving asymmet-
ric information regarding the amount of
money to be distributed (Overgaauw et al.,
2012; for a similar study see Kagel et al.,
1996). In the classic UltimatumGame pro-
posers canmake an offer of how to divide a
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sum of money. If the recipients accept, the
money is split accordingly. If they reject,
neither proposer nor recipient receive any-
thing. In this modified version, however,
the proposer was able to see the complete
amount of money, whereas the recipient
saw only a part of it (e.g., the proposer
saw all 10 coins, the recipient only 8).
The proposer was aware of this asymme-
try. The results revealed that proposers
gave less money when information was
hidden from the other person. The more
information was hidden, the lower the
amount of money offered. Intriguingly,
children at age eight already show this kind
of strategic—and clearly selfish—behavior
(Overgaauw et al., 2012).
Prosocial behavior also depends on the
available set of options. List (2007) con-
ducted a series of DG experiments that
introduced the possibility of taking money
away from the recipient. Dictators were
endowed with $10 and receivers with $5.
In the baseline condition, dictators were
given the option to transfer between $0
and $5 to the receiver. 71% of the partici-
pants gave a positive amount, and on aver-
age participants gave $1.33, which reflects
the expected findings from the previous
DG literature. Dictators in the second con-
dition, however, were given the option to
transfer between $0 and $5 or alternatively
take $1 away from the receiver. Here only
35% gave a positive amount, and on aver-
age participants gave $0.33. Dictators in
the third condition were given a symmetri-
cal set of options: they could either take up
to $5 or give up to $5. Here, only 5% gave
a positive amount, and on average partici-
pants took $2.48 away. These findings indi-
cate that the available set of options can
shift people’s expectations about which
actions are socially acceptable: if one has
the opportunity to give up to a certain
amount of money to another person, a fair
split is expected. But if one has the oppor-
tunity to either give or take money, giving
nothing or even taking a small amount
away seems less bad because taking away
everything would have been even worse.
One interpretation of these studies is
that people behave prosocially only if, by
doing so, they are able to meet the recipi-
ent’s expectations. Notably, there seems to
be a crucial difference for people between
knowing that their identity is concealed
(anonymity) and knowing that someone
expects them to behave in a certain way.
Even if people are interacting completely
anonymously with a stranger who cannot
see them and doesn’t know their names,
they might still feel the pressure of his
or her expectation. But when people are
able to evade social expectations, prosocial
behavior is reduced.
MEETING THE EXPERIMENTER’S
EXPECTATIONS
Participants’ behavior can also be influ-
enced by the presence of the experimenter.
To counteract this observer-expectancy
effect, Hoffman et al. (1994) conducted a
double-blind Ultimatum Game in which
the dictator’s decisions were known nei-
ther to the experimenter nor the recipient.
The authors describe a dramatic decrease
of cooperation in double-blind conditions
and conclude: “Other-regarding behav-
ior is primarily an expectations phe-
nomenon, rather than the result of an
autonomous private preference for equity.”
(p. 1). However, conventional double-
blind settings might still not fully con-
vince participants that they are not being
observed. Hence, Franzen and Pointner
(2012) applied the “randomized response
technique” (Warner, 1965), which should
guarantee perfect anonymity to partici-
pants. The technique involves two ran-
dom devices that allow participants to
give answers that are completely concealed
from the experimenter. As suspected, dic-
tators behaved even more selfishly in this
condition than the standard double-blind
condition. Thus, the more convincing the
concealment of their actions, the less peo-
ple feel pressured by the expectations of
the experimenter. Furthermore, people’s
prosocial behavior might be influenced
by an even subtler form of pressure than
by other people’s expectations, namely by
their own expectations.
MEETING ONE’S OWN EXPECTATIONS
Prosocial behavior can be reduced when
the connection between choices and out-
comes is obfuscated. In another modi-
fied version of the DG, dictators could
choose between two options: they would
receive $5 for choosing option A and $6
for choosing option B (Dana et al., 2005).
However, at this point they didn’t know
how much the recipient would get, which
was either $5 or $1. If dictators wanted,
they could decide, at no cost to them-
selves, to acquire information about the
recipient’s true payoffs before choosing
an option. Participants were told that the
recipient would not be informed about
this decision. However, in this experi-
ment only half of the dictators decided to
acquire this information while the other
half preferred to remain ignorant and
chose the option that was in their best self-
interest. Maybe dictators were reluctant to
acquire the payoff information in order
to evade the possibility of having to meet
their own expectation of behaving fairly.
By leaving the relationship between their
decision and the recipient’s payoff uncer-
tain, they were able to preserve the illusion
of behaving fairly.
IMPLICATIONS
In conclusion, these studies suggest that
many people are not interested in fair
outcomes per se. Models of social pref-
erences that only take into account the
final distributional payoffs are not able to
explain the decline of prosocial behavior
in these studies. Instead, preference mod-
els should also take into account psycho-
logical factors such as social expectations.
More specifically, it seems that many peo-
ple do not behave prosocially because they
intrinsically want to, but because they are
driven by the expectations of other par-
ticipants, experimenters, and even them-
selves. Perhaps, people are trying to meet
social expectations in order to avoid neg-
ative feelings such as shame or guilt as a
result of appearing unfair (Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2006). This might hold true
even if in fact people are just retaining the
illusion of not being unfair.
This interpretation is in line with find-
ings and theories from social psychologi-
cal research. Daniel Batson and colleagues
have argued that true moral motivation is
less prevalent than often assumed (Batson
et al., 1997, 1999; Batson, 2011). Instead,
they theorize, people are motivated to
appear moral without necessarily acting
according to the moral standard—a phe-
nomenon called moral hypocrisy. They
empirically demonstrated, for example,
that people assigned other participants
unfairly to tasks when personal costs were
at stake and that allegedly fair coin flips
were interpreted self-servingly (Batson
et al., 1997). Moreover, people behaved
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more fairly if they had to observe them-
selves in a mirror, presumably because by
doing so the discrepancy between their
own actions and themoral standard would
be too salient (Batson et al., 1999). Batson
and colleagues assume that people are
deceiving others and themselves to believe
that their actions are moral by either mis-
perceiving their actions as moral or by fail-
ing to compare their actions to the moral
standard.
It seems that the theory of moral
hypocrisy as well as other influential
work in the tradition of social psychology,
which discovered conditions for prosocial-
ity decades ago (e.g., Darley and Latané,
1968; Batson et al., 1981; Levine et al.,
2005), have only in parts been integrated
in behavioral economics. This even though
these theories can account for the find-
ing that people are evading social expec-
tations in order not to have to engage
in costly prosocial behavior. It could be
considered a failure of collaboration that
these theories and findings have not found
their way into behavioral economics ear-
lier. One explanation could be the different
methodology between the two fields. The
studies presented in this article stayed in
the framework andmethodology of behav-
ioral economics, and therefore, have direct
implications for findings from that tra-
dition. We hope that they will help to
bridge the gap between economic and
social psychological theories of human
prosocial behavior. Furthermore, we urge
researchers from both fields to ensure a
closer inter-disciplinary collaboration.
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